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Abstract  
The installment of a new government has augmented the prospect for implementing 
disinflation and exchange rate unification in Myanmar. A close look at the state 
budget shows that the reform of the budget system for state economic enterprises 
(SEEs) is essential. Reforms need to hold the replacement of controlled prices 
including the official exchange rate with market prices in SEE operations, and the 
separation of the SEEs from the state budget. But separating the SEEs from the state 
budget will necessitate careful planning to cope with SEE bankruptcies which would 
imposes another fiscal burden on the government. Therefore, economic viability 
must be a criterion for the continuation of their operations. 
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Restructuring the State Budget System 
for Disinflation and Exchange Rate Unification in Myanmar1 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Since Myanmar’s new government took office in March 2011, there has been the 
general perception that long pending economic reforms will finally be implemented. 
While disinflation and unification of the multiple exchange rates have been seen as 
priorities (Myat Thein, 2004), there has been little discussion on how to implement 
them. Pervasive administrative controls and little information on the Myanmar economy 
make it difficult to evaluate the necessary reform processes. The objective of this paper 
is to offer prospects for reform to deal with disinflation and exchange rate unification. 
While more than two decades have passed since Myanmar (previously Burma) started 
its transition to a market economy from ‘the Burmese way to socialism’, reform of the 
state sector has hardly been implemented. Government policy has done little more than 
tide over the economic crisis by partially allowing economic activity in the private 
sector. Deficits in the public sector have been financed by printing money which has 
caused chronic inflation. In addition, the government imposed strict controls on foreign 
exchange and on foreign trade by the private sector to secure foreign currency for the 
public sector. The combination of inflation and administrative controls has repressed the 
private sector. 
Disinflation cannot be achieved without overhauling the state sector. The heart of the 
problems in the state sector has been the state budget system for state economic 
enterprises (SEEs), in particular the use of officially controlled prices for SEE 
operations, and financial integrality of SEEs in the state budget.  
First, SEEs have operated under controlled prices, and the most important factor 
determining these prices has been the official exchange rate. This rate has never been 
adjusted for more than three decades; it now overvalues the domestic currency against 
the US dollar by more than a hundred times. The use of the controlled prices has 
functioned as cross subsidies in the public sector, and has made it difficult to grasp the 
economic performance of individual SEEs. 
Second, to cut down the expenditures of SEEs, the government deprived them of 
financial autonomy and subordinated their budgets to the state budget in 1989. This 
                                                  
1  This paper has benefited from discussions with former senior officials of the 
Government of Myanmar. 
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policy change did more harm than good. While the expenditures have been cut, the state 
budget system now automatically makes up for the deficits of the SEEs. This has 
aggravated their managerial inefficiency.  
The multiple exchange rate system that exists is the result of the state budget system 
based on the official exchange rate and the circumvention of exchange-rate controls by 
the private sector. Unifying the exchange rate will entail the abolition of the foreign 
exchange budget in the state budget system.  
This paper attempts to consolidate the available information in order to present the 
whole spectrum of necessary steps for disinflation and exchange rate unification. The 
remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the macroeconomic 
trends, especially the trend of inflation and fluctuations in the exchange rate. The main 
analysis is developed in Sections 3 and 4. Section 3 describes the state budget system 
for SEEs and the administrative controls on foreign trade and foreign exchange. Section 
4 explains why it is necessary to restructure the state budget system for SEEs; it also 
breaks down reform processes into several steps. Section 5 argues that the time is ripe to 
restructure the state budget system for SEEs to achieve disinflation and exchange rate 
unification. Section 6 offers some concluding remarks.  
 
 
2. Macroeconomic Trends: Inflation and Exchange Rate Fluctuation 
 
In 1988 Myanmar started its transition to a market economy from ‘the Burmese way to 
socialism’, a variant of a centrally planned economy. However, weak macroeconomic 
conditions were carried over into the transition process from the planned economic 
regime. Figure 1 summarizes the rate of inflation and changes in the parallel exchange 
rate for the last fourteen years. The parallel exchange rate refers to the Myanmar kyat 
vis-à-vis US dollar. A positive change indicates depreciation of the kyat.  
 
Figure 1 
 
Both the consumer price index (CPI) and the parallel exchange rate have exhibited 
instability. The average inflation rate per annum for the period from January 1998 
through December 2010 went as high as 22.6 percent. For the parallel exchange rate, a 
notable change has been its continuous appreciation against the US dollar in nominal 
terms since 2007 while inflation remained high in 2007 and 2008. This implies a sharp 
appreciation of the real exchange rate, which will be discussed later in this section. 
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2.1 Inflation and Fiscal Deficit 
High inflation in Myanmar has been attributable to monetization of fiscal deficit. Three 
factors are involved. First, Kubo (2007) confirmed a cointegration relationship between 
the money supply (money plus quasi money; M2) and the price level (CPI), suggesting 
that inflation is related to the growth in money supply over the long term. Fischer et al 
(2002) showed that while the short-run dynamics of the price level are influenced by 
various shocks, there is a stable relationship between the price level and the money 
supply in high inflation developing countries over the long term. Their argument applies 
to Myanmar. Second, the growth in the money supply mostly comes from changes in 
the amount of reserve money. Currency in circulation made up 58 percent of M2 as of 
the end December 2008. Third, the growth in reserve money is closely related to the 
growth in the central bank’s lending to the central government. In other words, the 
central government finances its fiscal deficit with treasury bills, and the central bank 
accepts them and increases its reserve money. This leads to a growth in currency in 
circulation, and a growth in money supply, which in turn brings about inflation. 
Heavy dependence on monetization as a measure to finance fiscal deficit is confirmed 
in Figure 2. This figure shows the changes in the central bank’s claims on the central 
government, the changes in commercial banks’ claims on the central government, and 
the net sales of treasury bonds in terms of percentage of GDP. Given that the size of the 
fiscal deficit has been more or less around five percent of GDP, the figure implies that 
the bulk of the fiscal deficit has been financed by the central bank. 
 
Figure 2 
 
A related question concerns the sources of the fiscal deficit. The operations of the 
Myanmar’s SEEs are diverse. They include large-scale monopolistic operations such as 
electric power generation and supply, railways, and the post and telecommunications. 
They also include operations such as textiles and foodstuffs where competition exists 
with the private sector and with imported goods. Table 1 summarizes the consolidated 
non-financial public sector operations for selected fiscal years. The term ‘Consolidated 
Accounts’ used in the table refers to the consolidated accounts of the central 
government and SEEs.  
 
Table 1 
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The table shows that the deficit of the SEEs accounts for a large portion of the fiscal 
deficit. However, it is difficult to disaggregate the deficit between the central 
government and the SEEs. On the one hand, the SEEs contribute financially to the 
central government through monetary transfers. For 2007 such transfers from SEEs 
surpassed their overall deficit. On the other hand, the World Bank (1995: 56-58) argues 
that there have been implicit subsidies from the central government to the SEEs which 
have been embedded in the provision of electricity and petroleum products at subsidized 
prices as well as interest subsidies on investment grants. The World Bank considers that 
when these subsidies are taken into account, the SEEs were still responsible for 
approximately 20 to 50 percent of the fiscal deficit in the early 1990s. Such estimates 
are not available for the fiscal deficit of recent years. 
 
2.2 Exchange Rate Fluctuations 
The official exchange rate is pegged to the Special Drawing Rights (SDR) of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) at K8.51 to one SDR. It has never been adjusted 
since 1977. As described in Hori and Wong (2008), the official exchange rate is applied 
only for transactions within the public sector. Private exporters have been allowed to 
retain the full amount of export revenue (after deduction of export taxes) since 1989; 
foreign exchange transactions in the private sector have been conducted at the parallel 
exchange rate. As of January 2012, the parallel market rate is around K800 per US 
dollar, while the official exchange rate is approximately K5.5 per US dollar.  
The prevalent use of the parallel exchange rate is indicated in the share of private 
sector imports to total imports. Table 2 summarizes the value of imports by ownership. 
There are two data sources, the Selected Monthly Economic Indicators (SMEI) of the 
Government of Myanmar, and the Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS) of the IMF. 
SMEI reports the import values by ownership (the private and public sectors). Apart 
from this, there is considerable discrepancy between SMEI and DOTS. In recent years, 
the discrepancy rose to the equivalent of the recorded volume of private imports. On the 
assumption that the discrepancy represents smuggling and under-invoicing by the 
private sector,2 the share of private sector imports to total imports was around 80 
percent for most of the years from 1997 through 2010. Such a high share of private 
sector imports implies that the parallel exchange rate has a greater influence on the 
economy than the official exchange rate. 
                                                  
2 When the import value of DOTS surpasses the total import value of SMEI, it suggests 
smuggling and under-invoicing by the private sector. On the other hand, when the 
import value of DOTS falls short of that of SMEI, one interpretation is over- invoicing 
by the private sector for the purpose of remittances. 
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Table 2 
 
The parallel exchange rate has exhibited sharp fluctuations in real terms. Figure 3 
depicts the trends of the real exchange rates of Southeast Asian currencies vis-à-vis the 
US dollar. In this figure, a rise in real exchange rate indicates depreciation. From 2006 
through 2010, the real exchange rate of the kyat has appreciated by 128 percent. While 
this appreciation is partially explained by the weakening of the US dollar against most 
currencies, the appreciation of the kyat is by far the sharpest among the Southeast Asian 
currencies, meaning that the Myanmar kyat has appreciated against the other Southeast 
Asian currencies as well during this period. 
 
Figure 3 
 
 
3. State Budget System and Administrative Controls 
 
Reforms for disinflation and exchange rate unification are related to reforms of the state 
budget system and relaxation of administrative controls on foreign trade and foreign 
exchange. This section outlines the state budget system3 and administrative controls. 
 
3.1 State Budget System for State Economic Enterprises 
 
3.1.1 Kyat Budget 
The foundation of the state budget system for state economic enterprises goes back to 
the change of national policy in 1988. Before this change, Myanmar had adhered to ‘the 
Burmese way to socialism’. The government implemented price controls on major 
agricultural crops and industrial goods, and SEEs operated according to the state plan 
with controlled input and output prices.  
Until 1989 the government permitted the SEEs to take loans from the Myanma 
Economic Bank (MEB), one of the state banks, and maintain revolving funds outside 
the centrally controlled budget. However, such loans resulted in accumulating debt. The 
outstanding loans from the MEB to the SEEs swelled from nine percent of GDP in 1978 
to 61 percent in 1988. Furthermore, the source of funds for loans to the SEEs was 
                                                  
3 The information on the budget system is based on the facts before 2009. Since then, 
there can be some changes in the system. 
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mostly the central bank lending to the MEB. In fact, the central bank had been lending 
to the SEEs indirectly through the MEB by printing money.4 In 1989, as a measure to 
cut SEE expenditures, the government prohibited them from taking loans. 
Since this policy change, the SEEs as well as ministerial departments have had to 
receive financing from the state budget not only for capital expenditures but also for 
current expenditures. The SEEs have to obtain approval from the Ministry of Finance 
and Revenue for their expenditures. Then the budget of individual SEEs is disbursed to 
their current accounts at the MEB. In addition, SEEs are not allowed to dispose of their 
revenue; they have to surrender it to the state budget. Thus, the disbursed budget 
imposes an effective ceiling on the SEEs expenditures. 
A schematic of the state budget system for the SEEs is presented in Figure 4. All 
SEEs and ministerial departments receive their budget from the central government 
through the State Fund Account (SFA). The SEEs also transfer their revenue to the SFA. 
In terms of cash flow, the SEEs surrender the remaining balance of their current account 
to the SFA by the end of each fiscal year. In terms of profit and loss, if a SEE happens to 
have a profit, its transfer to the SFA is registered as the SEE’s income tax and 
contribution to the government. A SEE’s deficit is registered as a net transfer from the 
government to the SEE. That deficit is already financed with the disbursed budget from 
the SFA, and the central government is liable for the remaining debt. 
 
Figure 4 
 
From the standpoint of the SEEs, their deficit does not remain as their debt. Thus, 
while the budget system does not allow the SEEs autonomy in their expenditures, 
neither does it hold them accountable their poor performance. Apart from the centrally 
planned production, some SEEs undertake consignment production for private firms, or 
form joint ventures with foreign firms. However, the profits (in a joint venture, the 
SEE’s portion of the profits) are also transferred to the SFA.  
While the SEEs perform poorly, the controlled prices of their goods are likely to 
produce private profits for SEE managers and their cronies. Because of the gap between 
the controlled selling prices of SEE goods and the prices for the same goods selling on 
the open market, SEE managers and cronies can profit privately by selling SEE goods 
on the black market. 
The next question is how the central government finances the SFA. The government 
                                                  
4 While MEB loans to SEEs equaled 61 percent of GDP, savings in the banking sector 
came to 11.3 percent of GDP as of 1988. 
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employs treasury bills and treasury bonds to finance the SFA, with the former as the 
main tool. The central bank accepts treasury bills, and prints and injects money into the 
government. The government uses the receipts from the SFA to discharge the treasury 
bills. Then, if the revenue of the SFA falls short of budget expenditures, it mostly results 
in the accumulation of outstanding treasury bills. This is the process of monetizing 
fiscal deficit where the deficit of the SEEs is automatically financed by the central bank 
through the SFA. 
 
3.1.2 Foreign Exchange Budget 
In addition to the kyat budget, the budget system collects and allocates foreign 
exchange within the public sector at the official exchange rate. SEEs have to obtain a 
Foreign Exchange Permit (FE permit) from the Ministry of Finance and Revenue as 
well as authorization from their respective parent ministries for individual expenditures 
in foreign currency. Once an FE permit is issued, the central government credits foreign 
exchange to the SEE’s account at another state bank, the Myanma Foreign Trade Bank 
(MFTB), and subsequently debits the equivalent kyat amount at the official exchange 
rate from the SEE’s account at the MEB. In this way, foreign exchange is rationed to a 
SEE at the official exchange rate. 
Furthermore, the SEEs cannot dispose of their foreign currency revenue. They must 
surrender all such revenue to the MFTB. When a SEE surrenders its foreign currency 
revenue, the equivalent amount of kyat at the official exchange rate is then credited to 
its current account at the MEB. 
 
3.1.3 Transactions at Officially Controlled Prices 
SEEs also do not have the autonomy to set input and output prices. Official prices are 
controlled by either their parent ministries or the Cabinet, depending on the importance 
of products. Strategic products whose prices are determined by the Cabinet include 
petroleum and vehicles. In a sense the official exchange rate, as the price of foreign 
currency, becomes the most significant officially controlled price. 
Apart from the official exchange rate, official prices are set based on costs and a 
certain mark-up. Because the costs of imported goods are calculated based on the 
official exchange rate, the more a product contains imported components, the wider the 
gap between the official and the competitive market prices in kyat. Moreover, official 
prices are not adjusted in a timely manner, so there can be a substantial gap between the 
official and market prices other than because of imported components. As a result, the 
official prices do not provide useful signals for resource allocation. 
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3.1.4 Evaluation 
While the state budget system allows the central government to hold down SEE 
expenditures, it has an adverse effect on the SEEs’ financial discipline. The losses of 
individual SEEs are passed on to the SFA, and the SEEs are not liable to the SFA. SEEs 
are not only state-owned but also state-run enterprises and financially subordinate to the 
state budget. The budget system provides little incentive for SEE managers to improve 
their operations. 
Moreover, the centralized budget system imposes obstacles on the management of the 
SEEs. For example, when a SEE needs to import repair parts for equipment, it has to go 
through the process of getting a foreign exchange permit with the parent ministry and 
the Ministry of Finance and Revenue. Since the introduction of the SFA, the 
profitability of the SEEs has declined (World Bank, 1995). 
Furthermore, transactions at the controlled prices mask the economic performance of 
individual SEEs. These enterprises often conduct transactions among themselves. 
Suppose that SEE-X imports petroleum using a ration of foreign exchange at the official 
exchange rate, and then delivers that petroleum to SEE-Y at the officially controlled 
price. The official price of petroleum is lower than the parallel market price since its 
cost is calculated at the grossly overvalued official exchange rate. That means the 
effective subsidies flow from the government to SEE-X along with the allocation of 
foreign exchange, and to SEE-Y in the form of the allocation of petroleum at the 
controlled price. Such cross subsidies between SEE-X and Y make it difficult to figure 
out the individual economic performance of both SEEs. 
 
3.2 Administrative Controls and Parallel Foreign Exchange Market 
 
3.2.1 Administrative Controls on Foreign Trade and Foreign Exchange 
Administrative controls on foreign trade and foreign exchange are applied to the private 
sector. While these controls are interrelated, it is useful for the purpose of analysis to 
disaggregate them into three categories: the holding of foreign currency, the 
convertibility of the kyat, and controls on imports.  
First, the foreign exchange regulations prohibit Myanmar people from holding 
foreign currency. It is the right as well as duty of private exporters to deposit their 
export earnings as foreign currency deposits (FCDs) at state banks,5 instead of holding 
foreign currency informally in hand. But the informal holding of foreign currency has 
                                                  
5 At times foreign currency deposits at private banks were also permitted. 
9 
 
been tolerated and widespread. These include proceeds from smuggling and remittances 
from people working outside the country. Informally held foreign exchange cannot be 
deposited in FCD accounts of the state banks. 
The second point concerns the convertibility of the Myanmar kyat with foreign 
currency. The official exchange rate is applied to transactions in the public sector only. 
When external trade in the private sector was legalized in 1988, private exporters could 
retain 60 percent of the foreign exchange they earned from exports, and 40 percent had 
to be surrendered to the government at the official exchange rate. In 1989 the retention 
rate was raised to 100 percent, and exporters were subject to a 10 percent export tax at 
the time they deposited their export earnings in their FCD accounts at the state banks.6 
The export tax has to be paid in foreign currency. Neither the government nor the 
central bank offers competitive buying rates to the export-tax-deducted FCDs. At the 
same time, there has been no allocation of foreign exchange to the private sector at the 
official exchange rate. 
Instead, the government has tolerated letting exporters carry out account transfers of 
FCDs to importers. This enables exporters to sell their export earnings and convert them 
into kyat at a competitive rate. Furthermore, from February 1993 the government 
introduced foreign exchange certificates (FECs). Since then, it has been possible for 
FCD holders to withdraw in FECs, and to sell these for kyat in the parallel market. 
The third point is concerned with regulations on current account transactions; both 
imports and exports require government licenses per shipment. Import licenses are 
issued on conditioned that applicants have sufficient FCDs at state banks to cover the 
import bills. This has resulted in two distinctive types of foreign exchange trade within 
the private sector as described in Figure 5. One is the buying and selling of FCDs. These 
are export earnings after the deduction of export taxes. These are eligible for obtaining 
import licenses. The other is the buying and selling of informally held foreign exchange. 
This is not eligible for obtaining import licenses, but it can be used to settle smuggling 
transactions. The large discrepancies between Myanmar import data and the 
corresponding data of trade-partner countries suggest that the unreported trade to 
Myanmar Customs settled with informally held foreign exchange is prevalent (See 
Table 2). 
 
Figure 5 
 
3.2.2 Evaluation 
                                                  
6 The export tax has been temporarily reduced for six months since September 2011. 
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Given the segmentation of the foreign exchange market, the question is why the 
government has maintained its restrictive administrative controls on the foreign 
exchange market of the private sector. Although segmented, there are two linkages 
between the public and private sectors, as shown in Figure 5.7 Such linkages might be 
the rationale for the government maintaining administrative controls, and for two 
reasons. First, export taxes are collected from the private sector in foreign currency. 
This becomes a part of the government’s fiscal revenue, and is allocated within the 
public sector through the state budget system. Second, state banks can channel the 
FCDs of the private sector to the state budget as loans. By tightening import licenses 
going to the private sector, the government can avail itself to more foreign exchange 
through this channel. 
If the government can bring the export earnings of the private sector into the banking 
system as FCDs, it is easy to impose taxes on them as well as temporarily borrow from 
them. By restricting import licenses on condition of possessing sufficient 
export-tax-deducted FCDs, the government can provide incentives to private exporters 
to properly declare export earnings and pay export taxes. 8  Consequently, the 
administrative controls as a whole have the effect to bringing together the foreign 
exchange available to the public sector. 
What are the prospects for relaxation of administrative controls? Since the mid 2000s, 
exploration and export of natural gas has brought in large export revenue which is 
believed to have improved the foreign exchange position of the government. 
Accordingly, administrative controls for keeping foreign exchange available to the 
government might be less crucial than before.  
On the other hand, tight import controls on certain goods such as vehicles have 
distorted the relative price of goods, and import licenses have come to yield a large 
amount of rent to those who obtain them. Groups with vested interests in tight import 
restrictions will most likely oppose to reforms to loosen them. 
Apart from the distortion caused by import restrictions, the gap between the official 
                                                  
7 In addition to these two, there is another linkage. Some SEEs and ministerial 
departments procure imported goods from private importers using their kyat budget. 
Government allocation of foreign exchange is concentrated in a small number of SEEs 
that have regular expenditures in foreign currency. Foreign exchange is not always 
allocated for one-off purchases of imported machines, in which case they are procured 
through the kyat budget from private importers. Such official procurement through 
private importers, when a large sum, may exert a depreciation effect on the parallel 
exchange rate. 
8 In fact, FCDs are traded in the private sector with some mark-up over the parallel 
market price of the US dollar, so that consumers of import goods partially shoulder the 
export tax by indirectly paying the mark-up on export earnings. 
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exchange rate and that of the parallel market does not itself directly distort the economic 
activity of the private sector. Since private exporters are permitted to retain export 
earnings as FCDs, the gap between the two exchange rates does not impose an effective 
tax on exporters, unlike the dual exchange rate regimes in other countries. At the same 
time the gap does not function as a subsidy to private importers because they are not 
allocated any foreign exchange. Instead, transactions in the private sector are conducted 
at the parallel exchange rate, and this rate is determined by market forces. Thus under 
Myanmar’s segmented foreign exchange market, the official exchange rate has scarcely 
any impact on the private sector. 
Nonetheless, there are a number of merits in unifying the segmented foreign 
exchange market. First, it would improve allocation efficiency. There can be a surplus 
of foreign exchange in one segment and a deficit in another. In such case, the 
reallocation of foreign exchange from one segment to the other would improve 
efficiency. 
Second, once the foreign exchange market is integrated, the government and the 
central bank can intervene to stabilize the exchange rate. Currently the private sector has 
been exposed to sharp fluctuations of the parallel exchange rate as pointed out in 
Section 2. Existing studies show that sharp fluctuations in exchange rate impede the 
growth of exports (Arize et al, 2000; Chowdhury, 1993; De Grauwe, 1988). One likely 
reason for such exchange rate fluctuations is that the parallel exchange market has been 
left uncontrolled by the government. By unifying the segmented foreign exchange 
market, the government and the central bank can influence the exchange rate of the 
private sector and bring more stability. 
 
 
4. Reform Process 
 
To address the question of what kinds of reforms are involved in disinflation and 
exchange rate unification, it is useful to consider the side effects of disinflation and 
exchange rate unification. Complementary reforms to alleviate such side effects can be 
regarded as a part of reforms. 
Disinflation requires preventing the monetization of the fiscal deficit. The deficits of 
state economic enterprises have accounted for a considerable part of the state’s fiscal 
deficit in the past and most likely still do, and the state budget system in effective 
automatically finances their deficits. Thus, reforms should include separating the SEEs 
from the state budget. 
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Exchange rate unification signifies replacing the foreign exchange budget of the state 
budget system with a foreign exchange market where the kyat is convertible with 
foreign currency. Once convertibility is established, there will be no need to institute the 
allocation of foreign exchange to the SEEs. At the same time, the SEEs will have to 
cope with the rise in the cost of foreign exchange from the official exchange rate to the 
competitive market rate. 
Successful disinflation and exchange rate unification hinges on whether the SEEs can 
stand on their own feet after separation from the state budget. Once separated from the 
state budget, the SEEs will have to accept market prices, and their financing will have to 
be replaced by bank loans. However, if SEEs are not economically viability, reforms 
could easily end up in a disaster of SEE bankruptcies and non-performing loans to 
banks. Rescuing SEEs and bailing out their debt would impose a fiscal burden on the 
central government, which is another obstacle for disinflation. Therefore, disinflation 
and exchange rate unification necessitate the careful designing of SEE reform. 
 
4.1 Devaluation of Official Exchange Rate 
The economic performance of the SEEs is masked by the controlled prices and official 
exchange rate. SEEs are required to sell goods at official prices that are lower than the 
market prices for the same goods. At the same time, SEEs are required to procure inputs 
from other SEEs at the official prices. Allocation of foreign exchange at the official rate 
from the state budget to SEEs works the same way. These transactions result in 
cross-subsidies among the SEEs, which makes it difficult to evaluate the economic 
viability of individual SEEs. 
Therefore, the first step for the reforms is to replace the controlled prices with market 
prices of the equivalent goods. This includes devaluating the official exchange rate to a 
level close to the parallel exchange rate. This would at least allow policy makers to 
understand better the economic performance of individual SEEs.  
When the central government has a surplus in its foreign exchange current account 
for a fiscal year, devaluation of the official exchange rate also lessens the fiscal deficit 
in terms of nominal kyat. According to the estimation of Kubo (2011), devaluation of 
the official exchange rate to the level of the parallel rate would have shifted the 
government’s fiscal balance to a surplus for 2008. 
Devaluation of the official exchange rate itself does not necessarily involve changes 
in allocation of foreign exchange in terms of US dollars. There is a concern that 
devaluation of the official exchange rate would raise the costs of the SEEs, which would 
in turn be shifted to the prices of the goods that SEEs provide to the economy and 
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aggravate inflation. Nonetheless, such a concern does not legitimate the budgeting of 
foreign exchange at the overvalued official exchange rate. If the policy objective is to 
maintain the affordable prices of certain SEE products, allocation of foreign exchange at 
the official exchange rate could be replaced by explicit subsidies to such SEEs. In fact, 
the allocation of foreign exchange at the official exchange rate is an implicit subsidy to 
the SEE at the cost of implicit taxation on those SEEs who are earning foreign exchange. 
After devaluation of the official exchange rate, explicit subsidies can substitute for it. 
 
4.2 Demarcation of State Economic Enterprises 
The next step of the reform is to select the SEEs to be separated from the state budget. A 
useful guideline for this selection is the economic viability of each SEE at market prices 
and a competitive exchange rate. If it is economically viable, a SEE can be separated 
from the state budget. 
For SEEs not economically viable, the government should maintain its involvement 
only if their operations are not easy to be commercialized but have external benefits to 
the whole economy. SEEs not economically viable and having little external benefits 
should be separated from the state budget. There are two options for such SEEs: one is 
liquidation, the other privatization. State involvement itself may be the original cause of 
managerial inefficiency. In such cases, privatization may improve managerial efficiency 
and economic viability. 
Separation from the state budget and termination of state ownership are two different 
dimensions. It is possible that the government maintains state ownership of a SEE after 
separating it from the state budget. There are many state-owned (not state-run) 
enterprises (SOEs) in China and Vietnam. Unlike in Myanmar, SOEs are in principle 
managed on a commercial basis. A particular concern with SOEs is financial discipline. 
Should an SOE become financially distressed, it can seek assistance from the 
government ex post; this gives less incentive for SOEs to improve operations ex ante. 
This is the so-called ‘soft budget constraint’ problem. In this regard, privatization is one 
step ahead of the simple conversion of SEEs to SOEs. 
 
4.3 Promotion of Financial Sector 
Once SEEs are separated from the state budget either as privatized enterprises or as 
SOEs, they have to rely on the financial market for financing. This necessitates 
development of the financial sector, especially that of banking. The banking sector 
includes both state banks and private commercial banks. Separation of SEEs from the 
state budget would improve their managerial efficiency and contribute to cutting down 
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the fiscal deficit, which would in turn stabilize inflation. Then disinflation would allow 
financial institutions to mobilize more deposits and provide financing to former SEEs. 
Thus, there can be a virtuous cycle of state budget reform and financial development. 
However, the experiences of other transition economies, particularly Vietnam, point 
out the non-performing loans problem in the process of reforming state enterprises 
(Unteroberdoerster, 2004). The soft budget constraint problem of SOEs is a major 
concern, and Myanmar can learn from the experience of Vietnam. 
 
4.4 Relaxation of Administrative Controls on Foreign Trade and Foreign Exchange 
Relaxation of administrative controls needs to take place on two fronts: one is to 
institute convertibility between the kyat and foreign currencies; the other is to relax 
regulations on current account transactions, namely import restrictions. These can be 
treated separately. 
Convertibility of the kyat provides the private sector with an authorized channel to 
buy and sell foreign exchange at a competitive rate. This means that the central bank 
buys and sells foreign exchange with the private sector through private and state 
commercial banks.  
In the context of Myanmar where the confidence in the kyat is weak, convertibility 
should be restricted to current account transactions. If permitted for purchasing foreign 
currency for asset portfolio selection, speculative demand on foreign assets could 
stimulate the flight to quality. The resulting reduced demand for kyat would lead to 
higher inflation (Giovannini and de Melo, 1993; Adam, 1995). Therefore, the purchase 
of foreign exchange should be restricted to current account transactions (i.e., for the 
settlement of imports). 
Two related issues concerning the convertibility of kyat are the foreign currency 
deposits (FCDs) of exporters and foreign assets of commercial banks. The former have 
already become prevalent, so it would be difficult to abandon them. Compelling 
exporters to surrender all their export earnings even at a competitive rate could 
stimulate mis-invoicing of exports. Conversely, if the market exchange rate were 
stabilized, exporters would voluntarily release their FCDs for kyat.  
As for the foreign assets of commercial banks, asset portfolio selection should be 
regulated as well. From the viewpoint of risk management, commercial banks should be 
allowed to maintain foreign assets to cover their holdings of foreign liabilities, namely 
FCDs of exporters. It would enable banks to mitigate potential losses from exchange 
rate fluctuations. Nevertheless, they should not be allowed to carry an excessively long 
position of foreign exchange, which could lead to speculation. 
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Regarding import restrictions, they are compatible with convertibility of the kyat and 
could continue even after exchange rate unification. Under the current system, import 
licenses are issued on condition that applicants have export tax-deducted FCDs at state 
banks. If the government institutes convertibility of the kyat, it should permit imports 
paid for with the foreign exchange raised from the authorized foreign exchange market. 
After that the government can still maintain import licensing if necessary. 
Finally, import restrictions should be reconsidered given the appreciation of the kyat 
in the parallel market since 2006. The kyat has appreciated sharply in the last five years. 
In the parallel market in late 2006, it was traded at around K1,300 per US dollar; now in 
January 2012 it has appreciated to around K800 per dollar. Given Myanmar’s high 
inflation rate relative to the United States, the kyat has appreciated more sharply in real 
terms (see Figure 3). This sharp appreciation damaged private exports which led the 
government to cut the export tax rate for six months from September 2011 as a 
temporary countermeasure . 
While the circumstances of such a sharp appreciation of the kyat are still not clear, a 
remedy to alleviate it is simple; relaxing import restrictions would stimulate demand for 
foreign exchange, which in turn would lead to depreciation of the kyat. In this regard, 
the government should at least consider increasing the issuance of import licenses on 
restricted items such as vehicles. 
 
 
5. Time is Ripe for Reforms 
 
The problems of the state budget system for state economic enterprises raised in this 
paper are not new; most of them have already been pointed out by Cook (1995) and the 
World Bank (1995). Since then there has hardly been any movement toward reforming 
the state budget system. This suggests that the reforms are not easy to implement. 
Given that the controlled prices of SEE goods can produce private profits for vested 
SEE interests by selling such goods on the black market, the budget system could be is 
likely a hotbed of corruption. Since it is likely the SEEs and ministries make fortunes 
from the system, a strong political will be required to reform it. In addition, import 
restrictions have distorted relative prices and produced the vested interests among 
cronies. Such vested interests are another obstacle to reforms. 
However, there are changes in the political economy landscape that may give impetus 
to the pending reforms. One is the installation of a new government in March 2011 that 
may have the political will to undertake the needed reforms. There have been a number 
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of positive policy changes since March 2011, including the opening of authorized 
foreign exchange counters from October 2011, and the reduction of the export tax rate, 
albeit temporarily, from September 2011. 
The improved foreign exchange position of the government has also given impetus to 
reform. The exploration and export of natural gas has brought the government large 
amounts of export revenue which has led to the accumulation of foreign reserves. This 
should allow the government to unify the exchange rates more comfortably without 
resorting to quantitative controls. 
The recent sharp appreciation of the kyat is another significant development. It has 
damaged the export industries in the private sector, notably the garment industry and 
that of pulses and beans as well as marine products. The government clearly needs to 
intervene to stabilize the exchange rate. For this purpose, it is essential to unify the 
segmented foreign exchange market. 
 
 
6. Concluding Remarks  
 
Since the inauguration of Myanmar’s new government in March 2011, expectations 
have increased that reforms for disinflation and unification of the multiple exchange 
rates will be undertaken. While pervasive administrative controls and the scarcity of 
information make it difficult to foresee the reform process, this paper attempted to 
present an overall view of the necessary reforms for disinflation and exchange rate 
unification. A close look at the state budget system shows that the reform of that system 
for state economic enterprises needs to be an essential part of disinflation and exchange 
rate unification. 
Preventing monetization of the fiscal deficit and unifying the exchange rates are 
expected to affect SEEs severely. As the state budget system has functioned to finance 
the deficit of the SEEs automatically, fiscal consolidation will require separating the 
SEEs from the state budget. Exchange rate unification will entail the abolition of the 
foreign exchange budget system for SEEs. This means the SEEs will have to cope with 
the rise in the cost of foreign exchange from the official exchange rate to the 
competitive rate. Thus, disinflation and exchange rate unification will require the SEEs 
to stand on their own feet. But the reforms will need to be implemented carefully, 
otherwise the SEEs could end up in bankruptcy, and their rescue would impose another 
fiscal burden on the central government which would fuel inflation. 
The reforms of the SEEs can be carried out in two steps. The first is to replace the 
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controlled prices, including the official exchange rate, with market prices in the 
operations of the SEEs. This will clarify the economic performance of individual SEEs. 
The second step is to select SEEs to be separated from the state budget. Economically 
viable SEEs can be separated from the state budget. For those that are not economically 
viable, the government should maintain involvement only if their operations are not 
easy to commercialize but have external benefits to the economy. The SEEs that do not 
fulfill these criteria need to be liquidated. Complementing this separation from the state 
budget is the need for measures to promote the financial sector. Once the SEEs are 
separated from the state budget, they will have to rely on the financial market for 
financing. 
Concerning the ownership of the SEEs to be separated from the state budget, there 
are two options: to maintain state ownership or to privatize. If the former is chosen, 
there has to be concern about the ‘soft budget constraint’ problem. The experiences of 
other transition economies has shown that the weak financial discipline of state-owned 
enterprises leads to the accumulation of non-performing loans and impose a large fiscal 
burden on the government to bail them out. Privatization is seen as the way to alleviate 
this problem. 
Regarding the convertibility of the kyat, it should be restricted to current account 
transactions in order to prevent capital flight and the resulting inflation. On the other 
hand, regulations on current account transactions, namely import restrictions, can be 
handled independently from convertibility of the kyat. It is possible for the government 
to maintain import restrictions even after instituting convertibility. Nonetheless, the 
recent appreciation of the kyat calls for relaxation of import restrictions to induce 
depreciation for export industries. 
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Figure 1 
Inflation and Changes in the Parallel Exchange Rate, January 1998 to June 2011 
 
Sources: International Financial Statistics CD-ROM, International Monetary Fund (IMF); Selected 
Monthly Economic Indicators, Central Statistical Organization (CSO), Myanmar; and various 
sources. 
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Figure 2 
Financing of Fiscal Deficit, 1996-2009 
 
Sources: International Financial Statistics CD-ROM, IMF; IMF (various issues);  Selected 
Monthly Economic Indicators, CSO, Myanmar; Statistical Yearbook, CSO, Myanmar; Key 
Indicators for Asia and the Pacific 2010, Asian Development Bank. 
Notes: “Treasury Bonds” refers to the net sales of treasury bonds (total sales minus discharged). 
“Borrowing from Central Bank” is calculated as the balance between the central bank’s claims to the 
government as of the end of the current fiscal year compared with the end of the previous fiscal year. 
“Borrowing from Commercial Banks” is calculated from the balance-sheet data of the consolidated 
deposit money banks. 
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Figure 3 
Real Exchange Rate of Selected Southeast Asian Currencies to the US Dollar, 
1997-2010 
 
Sources: Same as Figure 1 
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Figure 4 
State Budget System and Monetization of the Fiscal Deficit 
 
Source: Author 
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Figure 5 
Foreign Exchange Linkage between Public and Private Sectors 
 
Source: Author 
Note: SEEs and SFA refer to state economic enterprises and the State Fund Account, respectively. 
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Table 1 
Summary of Consolidated Non-financial Public Sector Operations 
 
Sources: World Bank (1995); IMF (2001); IMF (2009). 
Note: n.a. = data is not available. 
  
Fiscal Year 1992 1997 2002 2007
Union Government
Revenue n.a. 88 281 1,722
of which Tax Revenues 12.6 46 107 902
of which Transfers from SEEs 5.0 27 75 686
Expenditures n.a. 98 352 2,059
Overall Balance -7.1 -10 -71 -337
State Economic Enterprises
Receipts n.a. 185 445 2,265
Expenditures n.a. 232 576 2,704
Overall Balance -5.8 -47 -131 -439
Consolidated Accounts
Overall Balance -12.9 -57 -202 -776
Overall Balance (% of GDP) -5.2 -5.1 -3.6 -3.3
Billions of kyats
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Table 2 
Imports by Sector, 1997-2010 
 
Sources: Selected Monthly Economic Indicators, CSO; Direction of Trade Statistics CD-ROM, IMF. 
Note: DOTS refers to Direction of Trade Statistics. Myanmar Data reports the value of imports in 
kyat. This is converted into US dollar at the official exchange rate. 
 
(A) (B) (C ) (D) (E) (F)
DOTS (D)-(C ) [(A)+(E)]/(D)
Fiscal
Year
Private Sector
Imports
Public Sector
Imports
Total
Imports
Total
Imports Discrepancy
Private Sector
Share (%)
1997 1,645 663 2,309 2,706 397 75.5
1998 1,820 882 2,702 2,443 -258 63.9
1999 1,833 773 2,605 2,584 -22 70.1
2000 1,857 463 2,321 2,994 673 84.5
2001 1,777 958 2,734 2,696 -39 64.5
2002 1,786 511 2,297 2,998 700 82.9
2003 1,532 703 2,235 3,325 1,089 78.8
2004 1,354 626 1,979 3,491 1,511 82.1
2005 1,368 614 1,982 3,671 1,689 83.3
2006 1,804 1,125 2,928 4,247 1,319 73.5
2007 2,443 903 3,347 6,007 2,661 85.0
2008 2,592 1,971 4,563 6,768 2,205 70.9
2009 2,806 1,381 4,186 7,943 3,757 82.6
2010 4,623 1,781 6,404 10,326 3,922 82.8
Myanmar Data
US dollar, million
